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Few issues in the law of federal courts generate more excitement than the
relative strengths of state and federal courts and the power of the states to sue
on behalf of their injured citizens. Since Congress passed the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),' a tension has developed between these two is-
sues in federal courts. This Comment addresses that tension, the circuit split it
engendered, and the Supreme Court's attempt to resolve the split in its January
2014 opinion, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.2
The legal issue was as follows: CAFA permits a defendant in a class or mass
action to remove the action from state to federal court;3 the states, meanwhile,
frequently bring lawsuits on behalf of their injured citizens in their respective
state courts. States possess this power through the doctrine of parens patriae:
literally "parent of the country," parens patriae permits a state to bring an ac-
tion as a single party on behalf of a number of its injured citizens.4 As CAFA
has channeled more class actions and other aggregated claims into the federal
courts, the state attorneys general have more frequently brought parens patriae
actions in state court-and, in some cases, those actions have looked increas-
ingly like the class actions that CAFA seemed to target. The question in Hood,
1. 28 U.S.C. § 13 3 2(d) (2012).
2. 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 13 32(d).
4. The roots of patens patriae trace back to the "royal prerogative" of the king, as "father of the
country," to "act as the guardian for those under legal disabilities to act for themselves."
Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F. 3 d 332, 335 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000). For further
background on the doctrine of patens patriae, see generally Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 6oo (1982); and Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins,
State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 391 n.5, 475-77 (1995).
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then, was whether parens patriae actions, given their similarities to class ac-
tions, fell within the ambit of CAFA and could thus be removed from state to
federal court.
In Hood, the Supreme Court answered this question, which had divided the
circuits, with a decisive "no." Without acknowledging the sensitive issues of
federalism and state sovereignty that this question could have involved, the
Court's opinion was straightforward: as a matter of statutory interpretation, a
parens patriae action is not a mass action and is not removable to federal court
under CAFA.
This Comment discusses what Hood said, what it didn't, and where we
should go from here. Specifically, I argue that Hood signals at least two im-
portant developments with respect to CAFA: (i) a new emphasis on CAFA's
text, not its general purposes or legislative history, and (2) an apparent toler-
ance of litigation strategies designed to maneuver around CAFA and resist re-
moval to federal court.
Left unresolved, however, is the question of what should be done to ad-
dress the real risk of abuse of parens patriae. Hood seems to invite a legislative
fix. Prior to the decision, the Seventh Circuit argued that "protection against
excesses in the parens patriae context lies in the electoral process,"' and at least
one commentator proposed amending CAFA to "specifically exempt parens pa-
triae suits from removal." 6 In Hood, the Court focused on what CAFA "says,"
noted that Congress "easily could have" drafted different language if it intend-
ed otherwise, and implicitly directed disappointed litigants to their representa-
tives for relief.'
I argue, by contrast, that a better solution might be found through the law
of parens patriae standing. Standing doctrine provides the appropriate analyti-
cal frame for determining whether a state fairly represents the interests of its
citizens or whether it is merely acting as a class action representative in dis-
guise. In particular, this Comment recommends that parens patriae standing
analysis consider whether class actions are procedurally and practically availa-
ble to the injured parties. Where such an alternative remedy exists, courts
should generally find that the state lacks standing to proceed as parens patriae.
At least one state has embraced this approach of considering the availability of
class actions in parens patriae standing analysis, and such an approach could
close the parens patriae loophole if accepted more widely.
s. Addison Automatics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013).
6. Michael Jaeger, Note, Should They Stay or Should They Go: Can State Attorneys General Avoid
Removal of Parens Patriae Suits to Federal Court Under the Class Action Fairness Act?, 46 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 327, 356 (2012).
7. 134 S. Ct. 736, 742 (2014).
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I. CAFA, PARENS PATRIAE, AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
CAFA responded to concerns about abuses of class actions at the state court
level by channeling certain class actions from state to federal courts.8 Born out
of suspicion regarding jurisdictional gamesmanship, CAFA and its legislative
history seemed to evince a spirit of substance over form: the statute invited
courts to look beyond the labels parties might affix to their actions and deter-
mine whether the action is, in effect, a class action that should be subject to
CAFA's removal provisions.9
In the effort to bring "real" class actions to federal court, courts quickly en-
countered an interesting issue of potential gamesmanship: parens patriae ac-
tions brought by state attorneys general but often representing the interests of
a small group of their citizens. In 2008, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue
first and, relying on CAFA's overarching purpose of extending federal court ju-
risdiction and removing class action look-alikes, held that parens patriae ac-
tions were indeed mass actions subject to CAFA removal.1" The other circuits,
however, disagreed. Specifically, the Second,' Fourth, 2 Seventh, 3 and Ninth 4
Circuits all rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach and, relying on the plain mean-
ing of CAFA's text, held that a parens patriae action has only one plaintiff- the
state-and therefore "falls 99 persons short of a 'mass action,""'.. which re-
quires at least loo persons.
II. THE HOOD DECISION, IMPLICATIONS FOR CAFA, AND
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
A. The Supreme Court's Opinion
In January 2014, the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach
and endorsed that of its sister circuits. Hood's facts are typical of cases consider-
ing the tension between parens patriae and CAFA. AU Optronics is one of sev-
8. See 28 U.S.C. 5 133 2(d) (2012); S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4-27 (2005).
9. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 47; see also Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F. 3d 405,
407-08 (6th Cir. 2008).
1o. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F. 3d 418, 430 ( 5th Cir. 20o8).
ii. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 219-20 (2d Cir. 2013).
12. AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2012).
13. LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 772-74 (7th Cir. 2o11).
14. Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 670-72 (9 th Cir. 2012).
is. Id. at 672.
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eral manufacturers of liquid crystal display panels, or LCDs, to be sued for
price-fixing; from 20o6 to 2011, more than i5o actions were brought against
LCD manufacturers for antitrust violations -over one hundred of which were
styled as class actions. 6 In March 2011, the Mississippi Attorney General filed a
complaint against AU Optronics in the Mississippi Chancery Court asserting
causes of action under both the Mississippi Consumer Protect Act and Missis-
sippi's antitrust laws. 7 The Mississippi Attorney General's action was virtually
identical to the class actions brought against AU Optronics, 8 and private con-
tingency fee attorneys represented the Mississippi Attorney General.' 9 AU Op-
tronics, seeking a federal forum, successfully removed the action to federal
court under the theory, then accepted in the Fifth Circuit, that Mississippi's ac-
tion was in substance a "mass action" under CAFA. ° Although the district
court initially remanded the case to state court on other grounds,' the Fifth
Circuit ultimately affirmed the removal.'
At the Supreme Court, the major issues involved in this dispute were on
full display. Mississippi accused the Fifth Circuit of "violat[ing] the 'etiquette
of federalism."'23 Supporting Mississippi's position, forty-six state attorneys
general argued as amici that "forcing an unwilling State to proceed in federal
court" is an "affront to the sovereign dignity of the State" and "an affront to
established principles of federal-state comity."' With equal passion, AU Op-
tronics and its amici argued that "[i]f state attorneys general and their outside
counsel are permitted to rely on their parens patriae authority to circumvent
CAFA... the very purpose of CAFA will be eviscerated.""
16. Brief for Respondents at 5, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736
(2014) (No. 12-1036).
17. See Complaint at 50-53, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. G2o1-516 T/i
(Miss. Ch. Mar. 25, 2011).
18. Brief for Respondents at S, Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036).
19. Id. at io.
zo. Id. at io-ii.
21. Id. at 11.
22. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2012), rev'd, 134
S. Ct. 736 (2014).
23. Brief for Petitioner at 30, Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036) (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 515 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
24. Brief of Amici Curiae State of Illinois and 45 Other States in Support of Petitioner at 5-6,
Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036).
25. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20,
Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736 (No. 12-1036); see also Brief for Respondents at 51-52, Hood, 134 S. Ct.
736 (No. 12-1036) ("Congress's purpose in passing CAFA was to make sure high-exposure,
class-like cases could be brought to federal court.").
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Yet against this backdrop, the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion, au-
thored by Justice Sotomayor, was moderate in tone and straightforward in its
analysis. The Court-never once mentioning federalism, dignity, sovereignty,
or bias-focused on the text of the statute and reasoned that a single state is
not "loo or more persons" as required by CAFA's definition of "mass action."
"[T]he statute says 'ioo or more persons,"' Justice Sotomayor explained, "not
'100 or more named or unnamed real parties in interest. ' '26 The Court rejected
the notion that federal courts are free to "look behind the pleadings to ensure
that parties are not improperly creating or destroying diversity jurisdiction" in
all instances. That power, the Court explained, can come only from Congress,
and here, the straightforward text and structure of CAFA's "mass action" pro-
vision provided no such license.7
B. Implications for CAFA
The Hood opinion is, generally speaking, a model of textualist interpreta-
tion and judicial restraint. Although it resisted the sensitive issues looming in
the background of this dispute, the Court signaled at least two important de-
velopments with respect to CAFA.
First, the Court's largely textualist approach to interpreting CAFA is strik-
ing. Just one term ago, the Court had emphasized that interpretations of CAFA
should not "exalt form over substance, and run directly counter to CAFA's
primary objective" of extending federal jurisdiction over matters of "national
importance."'  Hood, by contrast, focuses on CAFA's text-without mention-
ing its "primary objective"-and hence departs from the Court's earlier guid-
ance on how to interpret this statute. Moreover, while lower courts had previ-
ously made much of CAFA's legislative history and the policies that the statute
seemed to promote,29 the Court seemed to remind lower courts that, "when
'the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts ... is to enforce
it according to its terms."'30 CAFA, the Court suggested, is no exception. Addi-
tionally, because the Court seemed to find little ambiguity in the text of CA-
26. Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 742. The Court's opinion was not, however, entirely formalist; it noted
that the Fifth Circuit's approach would, as a practical matter, result in an "administrative
nightmare." Id. at 743.
27. Id. at 745-46.
28. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013).
29. See, e.g., Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 407-08 (6th Gir. 2008);
Brook v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., No. o6-CV-129 54, 2007 WL 2827808, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2007).
30. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2ooo) (quot-
ing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
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FA's mass action provision,3' Hood casts doubt on the relevance of the oft-cited
(but much-disputed) legislative history of CAFA, or at least its mass action
provision. Therefore, the Hood decision may come not only to the aid of states
resisting removal of their parens patriae actions, but also to the aid of all plain-
tiffs whose adversaries invoke CAFA's spirit and history to support removal
from state to federal court.
Second, by adopting a more formalist interpretation of the statute, Hood
suggests some tolerance of the jurisdictional maneuvering that CAFA has long
been thought to resist. By declining to probe into Mississippi's purposes in
structuring its action the way that it did, the Court gives an implicit nod to the
"well-established rule that plaintiffs, as masters of their complaint, may choose
their forum by selecting state over federal court."3" Furthermore, because the
Court hews so closely to CAFA's text without discussing the uniquely sensitive
issues associated with parens patriae standing, Hood seems to provide a more
general invitation to the jurisdictional gamesmanship that many had consid-
ered to be at odds with the basic spirit of the statute.33
C. Unresolved Issues
For all that Hood might say about CAFA, it says remarkably little about the
dilemma at the heart of this dispute: what should we do about the potential
abuse of parens patriae actions ?'
The risk of abuse is real. To provide just three considerations: we now
know that contingency fee lawyers routinely approach and represent state at-
torneys general in actions virtually identical to the class actions they bring in
other states;35 that the state attorneys general can be vulnerable to political
31. See Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 742. It is possible, of course, that other sections of CAFA are less clear
and may call for a different analysis.
32. Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009).
33. See discussion supra note 9 and accompanying text.
34. This Comment seeks to avoid taking a normative view on whether parens parriae actions
belong in state or federal courts. Rather, my goal is to suggest that some uses of parens pa-
triae may be inconsistent with the doctrine's core goals of protecting the interests of (1) sov-
ereign states and (2) citizens who are less able to vindicate their own interests through judi-
cial and political processes. See discussion supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-59 (1972) (discussing historical function of
patens patriae).
35. In arguing that the Fourth Circuit should have adopted the Fifth Circuit's approach and
called parens patriae actions "mass actions" under CAFA, Judge Gilman explained:
I believe that my analysis is strengthened by the fact that some of the same private
attorneys representing the Attorney General here are simultaneously representing
individuals who have filed essentially identical claims against the same defendants
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pressure" and to manipulation by deep-pocketed private plaintiffs;37 and that
parens patriae actions brought in state courts have nearly doubled since CAFA
was enacted. 8 These developments suggest that parens patriae actions may
present serious risks to the independence of state attorneys general, to the fair
representation of citizens in parens patriae actions brought by their states, and
to the rights of out-of-state defendants whose actions would be removable un-
der CAFA but for the availability of parens patriae.
in Michigan and Minnesota .... If one were to close one's eyes as to who the
named plaintiff is in the three lawsuits, there is no way to detect a material differ-
ence between the Attorney General's request ... in the present case and the same
claims that are pending in Michigan and Minnesota.
West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 646 F.3d 169, 182 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Gilman, J., dissenting); see also Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Repre-
sentative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARv. L. REv. 486, 493 (2012) ("[S]tate attor-
neys general can and do engage in litigation that bears a striking resemblance to the much-
maligned damages class action."); id. at 524 ("[A]ttorneys general sometimes hire private
counsel to litigate state cases on a contingency basis."); Timothy Meyer, Comment, Federal-
ism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the New Federalism,
95 CAT-F. L. RFv. 885, 897 (2007) (discussing the use of contingency fee lawyers as repre-
sentatives of state attorneys general).
36. The state attorney general is directly elected in forty-three states. Note, Appointing State At-
torneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive, 127 HAIv. L. REV. 973, 974 (2014).
Several commentators have expressed concern over the potential politicization of the attor-
ney general's role. See, e.g., Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the State
Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 23 (1993) ("[T]he politicization problem cuts
in favor of the appointive model."). But see William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?
Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446,
2467-68, 2475-76 (2006) (arguing that the election of state attorneys general disperses pow-
er and promotes public accountability).
37. The recent controversy surrounding hedge fund manager William Ackman's campaign
against Herbalife illustrates this concern: Ackman stated that he would pressure the attor-
neys general of every state to file complaints against the company, and the attorneys general
of several states complied before realizing that they were not representing real victims from
their states. Instead, they were merely supporting Ackman's investment position. See Mi-
chael S. Schmidt, Eric Lipton & Alexandra Stevenson, After Big Bet, Hedge Fund
Pulls the Levers of Power, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2oi4/o3/io
/business/staking-i-billion-that-herbalife-will-fail-then-ackman-lobbying-to-bring-it-down
.html [http://perma.ccYJ4B-7N77].
38. A search on Westlaw for parens patriae actions in the eight years preceding CAFA's enact-
ment (that is, 1997-2004) and the eight years after it (that is, 20o6-2o13) reveals that the av-
erage annual number of parens patriae actions brought in state court has increased from ap-
proximately 77 to 148-an increase, in other words, of 93%. This growth cannot be
attributed solely to CAFA; many factors have led to the expansion of the offices and litiga-
tion capabilities of attorneys general in the past two decades. However, the growth does
suggest that at least some would-be class actions have found their way into state courts as
parens patriae actions.
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These risks of abuse are not present in all parens patriae actions. Many pre-
sent-day uses of parens patriae bear the hallmarks of the doctrine: the state
comes to court asserting an interest either independent of its citizens or on be-
half of identifiable citizens who would otherwise be unable to sue. For exam-
ple, states continue to sue as parens patriae to protect sovereign interests in wa-
ter and other natural resources,39 or to challenge acts of private discrimination
affecting marginalized groups that may be unable to bring suit on their own.4 °
In actions such as these, parens patriae serves as an important means -and, at
times, the only means - to protect interests shared by a large number of the
state's citizens. Recent examples of states using parens patriae for such purpos-
es illustrate the positive role that the doctrine continues to play.
The viability of parens patriae is undermined, however, when the doctrine
is exploited by private individuals who are capable of bringing private actions
but seek the benefits of coming to court in the name of the state- including the
ability to evade CAFA and stay in state court. The filing of parens patriae ac-
tions nearly identical to class action complaints brought by the same attorneys
in other states, or a hedge fund's alleged exploitation of state attorneys general
as part of a well-coordinated shareholder activism strategy,41 provide vivid il-
lustrations of parens patriae abuse.
Hood does little to address this problem. Rather, the decision leaves unan-
swered a question that Chief Justice Roberts posed to Mississippi in oral argu-
ment: "[W]hat prevents attorneys general from around the country sitting
back and ... as private class actions proceed ... taking the same complaint,
maybe even hiring the same lawyers, to go and say, well, now we are going to
39. See, e.g., State v. City of Dover, 891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006) (permitting New Hampshire to
bring a products liability action against manufacturers, distributors, and suppliers of gaso-
line additives that allegedly polluted the state's water supplies). Courts have long approved
of states' use of parens patriae in suits involving natural resources -akin to public nuisance
actions - as an important means of protecting a statewide interest. See, e.g., North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1923) (confirming "[t]he right of a State as parens patriae
to bring suit to protect the general comfort, health, or property rights of its inhabitants"
against flooding caused by the "action of another State"); Kansas v. Colorado, 18S U.S. 125,
142 (1902) (finding that Kansas's suit "as parens patriae ... representing and on behalf of
her citizens" was the proper means to seek redress from Colorado's diverting river water
away from Kansas and its residents).
40. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D. Mass. 1998)
(permitting the Massachusetts Attorney General as parens patriae to sue a Massachusetts
employer for age-based discrimination).
41. See Schmidt, Lipton & Stevenson, supra note 37.
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bring our parens patriae action?"' It is this question-the elephant left in the
room after Hood- that I next address.
III. PARENS PATRIAE STANDING AND THE PATH FORWARD
The remedy to this problem might come from an unlikely source: the fed-
eral court doctrine of parens patriae standing. After all, the analytical issue at
the heart of the perceived abuse is not one about removability or the superiori-
ty of the federal forum; rather, it is whether the state is truly acting as a state -
not as a class action representative in disguise.
This inquiry bears a striking resemblance to standing analysis: it asks
whether or not the state is seeking to redress its own injury or that of only a
handful of its citizens. This is precisely the inquiry that federal courts have de-
veloped in determining whether a state has standing to bring an action as
parens patriae. Under Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico and its progeny, a
state may not proceed as parens patriae if it acts as "only a nominal party with-
out a real interest of its own";' rather, it must "(1) articulate an interest apart
from the interests of particular private parties, (2) express a quasi-sovereign in-
terest, and (3) allege injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its popula-
tion."' This inquiry-which is independent from the question of removal un-
der CAFA - is the appropriate analytical starting point for evaluating whether a
state is abusing its authority to proceed as parens patriae.
Why, then, has the issue of standing been overlooked by those, like Chief
Justice Roberts, who have puzzled over the tension between CAFA and parens
patriae? One reason might be the view that standing doctrine governs onlyfed-
eral courts and does not control what the Mississippi Attorney General might
do in the courts of his own state.4' This view is right as a formal matter but
wrong in practice. 46 The reality is that state courts have incorporated Snapp's
42. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134
S. Ct. 736 (2014) (No. 12-1036), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument
_transcripts/12-1036_hgcj.pdf [http ://perma.cc/B4QC-8XVZ].
43. 458 U.S. 592, 6oo (1982).
44. 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL lOl.6o (4)(c)(i) (citing
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607 (1982)).
45. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (noting that "the constraints of Arti-
cle III do not apply to state courts.").
46. Helen Hershkoff aptly points out that, more generally, "many state court judges conform
their role to Article III limits, on the view that the federal model reflects the proper measure
of the adjudicative function." Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Re-
thinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1876 (2OO1). Hershkoff attributes this
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standing requirements in determining whether the state attorney general has
the authority to bring an action as parens patriae. In fact, state courts routinely
apply Snapp's general standard-set forth by federal actors, including Chief
Justice Roberts himself- to see whether the interests of their attorneys general
are sufficient.4' State courts have often found that the state may proceed as
parens patriae, 4s but they have also often found such authority lacking.
49
Federal actors may therefore continue to play a role in determining what
state attorneys general may do in their own courts by refining the law of parens
patriae standing and allowing this law to filter down to the state courts. In par-
ticular, if federal judges are concerned about class actions masquerading as
parens patriae actions to evade CAFA, then they could clarify that the availabil-
ity of a class action for harmed individuals is a factor counseling against a find-
ing of parens patriae standing. Considering the availability of class actions in
parens patriae standing analysis is consistent with Snapp, since this considera-
tion helps courts understand whether a state has an "interest apart from the in-
terests of particular private parties." A state is less likely to have such an inter-
est when its parens patriae action mirrors the class action "particular private
parties" could bring instead. So by considering whether class actions would be
available to private parties, courts would vindicate the core teachings of Snapp
and clarify the relationship between class actions and parens patriae.
As an illustration of this approach, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
recently considered the availability of class actions as an alternative to a parens
patriae action.50 Remanding the state's action against gasoline suppliers seek-
ing damages for groundwater contamination, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court explained that in evaluating the state's parens patriae authority, the trial
phenomenon, in part, to the common law foundations of federal justiciability doctrine. Id. at
1877-82.
47. Indeed, one state judge even remarked that parens patriae is, in general, "a creature of feder-
al jurisprudence" and explained that the states follow federal court standards in evaluating
parens patriae authority. Louisiana v. Twin Cities Mem'l Gardens, Inc., 997 So. 2d 16, 19
(La. Ct. App. 2008).
48. See, e.g., State v. Native Vill. of Curyung, 151 P. 3d 388, 399-402 (Alaska 2006); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 552 (Ga. 2006); Twin Cities Mem'l Gar-
dens, 997 So. 2d at 22; Hood ex rel. State v. BASF Corp., No. 56863, 2006 WL 308378, at *3
(Miss. Ch. Jan. 17, 2006); State v. City of Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 529-30 (N.H. 2006).
49. See, e.g., Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Fla. 2006); State v. Daicel Chem.
Indus., Ltd., No. 02-CH-19575, 2003 WL 25564146 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 10, 2003); Hood ex
rel. State v. Microsoft Corp., No. G2004-1542 0/3, 2007 WL 1108450 (Miss. Ch. Mar. 30,
2007); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 836 N.Y.S.2d 40, 51-52 (Sup. Ct. 2007), affd, 893
N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 2008); State ex rel. Abrams v. N.Y.C. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 472
N.Y.S.2d 839, 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Lubin, 222 S.W.3 d 417, 423
(Tex. 2007).
5o. State v. Hess Corp., 2o A.3d 212, 223 (N.H. 2011).
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court should consider as a factor whether individual property owners could
bring a class action against the gasoline companies." By adopting this consid-
eration in analyzing parens patriae standing, federal courts thus prevent the use
of parens patriae to evade CAFA; states would generally not be able to bring
parens patriae actions where class actions are available, and the injured indi-
viduals would be forced to bring a separate action-one likely subject to CA-
FA's provisions.
The question of whether class actions are available should be practical in
nature. The goal I endorse here is to limit the use of parens patriae to situations
in which private litigants cannot, as either a formal or practical matter, bring
suit on their own. In some cases, the practical availability of a class action will
be obvious based on real world examples of class actions asserting identical or
similar claims. In Hood, for example, over one hundred claims against LCD
manufacturers had successfully been certified as class actions before Mississippi
filed a similar claim. 2 In other instances, however, a court may need to consid-
er several factors in evaluating the feasibility of a class action. These factors
could include, for example, procedural barriers, such as sovereign immunity3
or statutes of limitations, 4 that may stand in the way of a class action but not a
patens patriae suit. Courts could also consider the challenge of ascertaining
class members,"5 the amount of recovery sought, 6 and the relative resources of
51. Id.
52. See Brief for Respondents at 5, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics, 134 S. Ct. 736
(2014) (No. 12-1036).
53. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 739 (1981) (a parens patriae action is appropri-
ate where individual consumers would lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
Louisiana state tax).
54. See, e.g., Page v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 13o F.R.D. 510, 513-14 (D.D.C. 199o) (exclud-
ing from class action parties with time-barred claims); Nancy Morawetz, Underinclusive
Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 402, 421-22 (1996) (discussing challenges facing parties who
are excluded from narrow class definitions and whose claims are ultimately barred by stat-
utes of limitations).
55. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 164-66 (2d Cir. 1987) (explain-
ing that ascertaining class members is often difficult in the mass tort context because of the
number of individuals affected and because causation often varies among individuals); In re
MTBE Prod. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining difficulties in
identifying private well owners harmed by defendants' contamination, where each well
must be examined by a professional and where individuals often fail to detect contamina-
tion).
56. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 739 (approving of the use of parens patriae
where individual consumers, though identifiable, "cannot be expected to litigate ... given
that the amounts paid by each consumer are likely to be relatively small").
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the parties' in determining whether a parens patriae claim could instead be
brought as a class action. These factors will, of course, be resolved as a matter
of degree, but courts could apply them flexibly with the goal of ensuring that a
state becomes neither beholden to class action lawyers nor incapable of protect-
ing those of its citizens who cannot protect themselves.
This Comment thus proposes that courts engaging in parens patriae stand-
ing analysis consider the availability of class actions as a factor counting against
standing. This approach yields three key advantages over the most obvious-
and most likely -alternative: a legislative fix providing for the removability of
parens patriae actions to federal courts. First, the standing-based approach pre-
serves the states' general ability to sue in their own courts. As a result, this ap-
proach respects the states' dignity and sovereignty interests, provides the con-
venience that state attorneys general want in accessing courts, and-given the
role of state attorneys general as regulators whose actions often jump-start na-
tional regulation -provides for the variance and experimentation across court
systems that makes the most of the modern state attorney general's role. Se-
cond, the standing-based approach is preferable to amending CAFA because it
is analytically cleaner: whereas any amendments to CAFA necessarily involve
questions regarding the superiority of one forum over another, standing analy-
sis allows decision makers to focus squarely on the issue of whether a state at-
torney general is truly acting on behalf of the state's citizens, without allowing
concerns about removability and forum to cloud the analysis.
Finally, as a matter of institutional competence, state courts are likely supe-
rior at determining whether their attorneys general are truly representing state
interests. Whereas federal courts may balk at questioning a state's self-stated
interest in suing as parens patriae,58 state courts-however less effective they
might be in managing class actions - are perfectly capable of distinguishing be-
tween "real" state interests and private actions under the veil of parens patri-
ae.59 So, for example, a New York judge can determine whether its attorney
57. See, e.g., State v. Hess Corp., 20 A.3d 212, 223 (N.H. 2011) (noting that "individual plaintiffs
would have to litigate against many of the largest gasoline companies in the world").
58. See, e.g., In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 821 F. Supp. 2d 591, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Alabama
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 229 F.R.D. 669, 673 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
59. State courts' proficiency in evaluating state interests in the parens patriae context may relate,
in part, to state courts' greater familiarity with local conditions and with state attorneys gen-
eral. See Hershkoff, supra note 46, at 1886 (noting that "[s]tate judicial districts tend to be
smaller than their federal counterparts; commentators hypothesize that 'state trial judges are
likely to feel closer links to their local communities than federal judges"') (quoting Donald
W. Brodie & Hans A. Linde, State Court Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope
of Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 542)). For more on state courts' expertise in understanding
local conditions, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L.
124:563 2014
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general has parens patriae authority to challenge excessive executive compensa-
tion at a stock exchange, ° while a Mississippi judge can determine whether a
scheme to fix the prices of certain household goods affected a sufficient number
of households in its state to support parens patriae authority. 6' To summarize,
the standing solution is superior to a legislative fix because it allows the right
actors to do the right analysis in the right forum.
CONCLUSION
The clash between CAFA and parens patriae raises deep questions about
federalism and state sovereignty, and Hood presented the Supreme Court with
an opportunity to weigh in. The Court did not take the bait. Its all-business
opinion suggests that lower courts should put aside CAFA's general purposes
and legislative history, zero in on the text of the statute, and let Congress fill in
whatever gaps the statute might have. But Hood failed to resolve the core issue
at the heart of this dispute and may prompt an unwise legislative fix. To close
the parens patriae loophole in CAFA, this Comment instead suggests, federal
and state courts should turn to the law of parens patriae standing and indicate
that a state may lack parens patriae authority where class actions are available
to its citizens. This approach appreciates both the potential abuse of parens pa-
triae and the importance of legitimate parens patriae actions; in this way, it
helps courts draw the difficult line that Hood avoids.
PATRICK HAYDEN
REv. 1141, 1155 (1988); and Note, Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention
Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134, 1145-46 (1980).
6o. New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 836 N.Y.S.2d 40, 51-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007), affd, 893
N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 2008).
61. Hood ex rel. State v. BASF Corp., No. 56863, 2006 WL 3o8378 (Miss. Ch. Jan. 17, 2006).
* I thank the editors of the Yale Law Journal, especially Daniel Randolph, for their thoughtful
recommendations and advice. I also thank Professor Judith Resnik, who taught the course
that inspired this Comment.
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